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This paper computes several indicators of water coverage, quality, and prices in 
Ecuador’s two largest cities: Quito and Guayaquil—both before and after the 
privatization of water services in Guayaquil. The type of data sources that are 
used make it possible to specifically control for income and, thus, to evaluate 
changes in water provision, particularly among the poor. These indicators provide 
useful information about how certain water-related services have changed over 
time and facilitate evaluating the performance of each company. It should be 
emphasized, however, that such estimates cannot be used to identify the causal 
effects of the privatization of water provision. In particular, differences in a) 
before-concession water-coverage trends, c) rural-to-urban migration patterns, 
and c) other idiosyncratic institutional characteristics between these two cities, 
suggest that Quito may not be a suitable control group for identifying the casual 
effects of privatization. 
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1. Introduction 
Many Latin American countries face similar water problems: deteriorating systems and 
networks, lack of access to water and sewage for many of the populations’ poorest, and 
governments without the resources or expertise to invest in change. Unfortunately, there is little 
consensus on how to solve these problems. Many countries, including Ecuador, have embarked 
upon various forms of privatization to increase investment in infrastructure and improve service 
provision and water quality. Most of the time, however, the privatizations have generated 
substantial controversy.  
In the hopes of clarifying the true impact of water privatization—an issue where ideology 
often overrides the facts—researchers have implemented numerous studies. Unfortunately, the 
results remain contradictory. On the one hand, the World Bank states that the number of water 
connections in Latin America has increased considerably since the days of privatization, and that 
the venture as a whole has had “no major adverse impacts on poverty and inequality” (Leipziger, 
2004). A number of authors have reported large gains in productivity and profitability associated 
with privatization in other sectors (Megginson, Nash, and van Randenborgh, 1994; Barberis et 
al., 1996; Frydman et al., 1999; La Porta and López-de-Silanes, 1999), providing evidence that 
points to privatization’s achievements in increasing investment and productivity as well as 
improving the access of poorer communities. In addition, privatization is shown to have 
improved health indicators. For example, one study found that the expansion of water hook-ups 
as the result of water services privatization was associated with an 8 percent reduction in child 
mortality. Moreover, most of the reduction occurred in low-income areas (26 percent), where the 
network expansion was greatest (Galiani et al., 2005). 
On the other hand, there have been many examples in both developed and developing 
countries where the privatization of water and sewage has faced serious challenges and has led to 
little, if any, net improvement in service provision. For example, structural adjustment reforms 
mandated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) led to increases in water prices in 
Cochabamba, Bolivia’s third largest city, by as much as 200 percent, provoking widespread 
protests. In addition, international reviews in Europe and in the Unites States do not find clear 
cost savings associated with privatization (Boyne, 1998; Renzetti and Dupont, 2003; Hodge, 
2000), and privatization rates among municipalities in the United States have actually fallen 
since 1997, according to the International City/County Management Association (Warner and   5
Hefetz, 2004). City officials cite problems with service quality and lack of cost savings; and 
statistical analysis of this reversal finds that problems with monitoring are key (Hefetz and 
Warner, 2004).
2   
Rather than finding new evidence for or against privatization, in this paper we document 
the water provision experiences in the two largest cities in Ecuador: Guayaquil and Quito. 
Guayaquil, the largest city in Ecuador, has struggled to provide adequate water and sewage 
services to its residents. In the early 1990s, when water companies were run by the municipality, 
coverage rates were dramatically low. In 1994, the municipal government set into motion a 
process of restructuring the public water and sewage companies and began to lay the groundwork 
for what would lead to the privatization of the sector. In 2001, the municipal water regulator 
signed a 30-year integrated concession with Interagua, a subsidiary of the International Water 
Group. This concession handed over commercial risk and responsibility for the operations, 
maintenance, and administration of all potable water and sewage services in Guayaquil. On the 
other hand, in Quito, water-service providers have always operated under the direct authority of 
the municipality. Although they have historically performed better than the public companies in 
Guayaquil, the municipal water and sewage companies in Quito also faced financial management 
difficulties in the early 1990s. Instead of pursuing privatization, however, reforms were 
introduced to create more business-oriented practices.  
To evaluate the effects of the privatization of water services in Ecuador, it is tempting to 
compare changes in water performance indicators (before and after privatization) between these 
two cities. In fact, several civil groups have criticized the terms of the concession process by 
making merely subjective comparisons between the performance of the private water company in 
Guayaquil with that of the publicly owned water company in Quito.
3 Such comparisons could 
only identify the effects of privatization if Quito and Guayaquil were identical cities and if the 
privatization of water services was randomly assigned to the latter city. This is, of course, not the 
case.  
                                                           
2 For additional references that analyze the privatization of water services see Caplan et al. (2004), Clarke et al. 
(2004), Foster (2002), and Neu and Rahaman (2003). Other studies that analyze privatization processes more 
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3 In the initial years of the concession there was very little negative public opinion about the process, but recently 
complaints about water quality have increased, and several civil groups have criticized the terms of the concession 
process. In some cases, arguments against the privatization of water services in Guayaquil have been made by 
comparing the performance of the private water company with the performance of a publicly owned water company 
in Quito. Most of the time, however, these comparisons have been merely subjective.   6
This paper has two main goals. First, we attempt to provide an objective comparison of 
several indicators of water coverage, quality, and prices in both cities—both before and after the 
privatization of water services in Guayaquil. The type of data sources that we use allows us to 
specifically control for income and, thus, to evaluate changes in water provision, particularly 
among the poor. These indicators provide useful information on how certain water-related 
features have changed over time and facilitate evaluating the performance of each company. 
Secondly, we thoroughly document why such an exercise cannot identify the causal effects of the 
privatization of water provision. In particular, we argue that before-concession water-coverage 
trends, rural-to-urban migration patterns, and other idiosyncratic institutional differences 
between these two companies may be driving a large portion of the quantitative results. 
To assess how coverage levels have changed in Quito and Guayaquil, we gather data 
from two national income and expenditure surveys that were administered in both cities in 1995 
(before concession of water services) and in 2004 (after concession). Then, we use a binary 
probit model and our database to identify the conditional probability that a household has access 
to water services. Our estimates provide evidence that, in Guayaquil, households in the lowest 
income quintile have a 7 percent less chance of receiving water services compared to 10 years 
ago (before the concession). In Quito, on the other hand, a household in the lowest income-
quintile in 2004 had a 3.5 percent higher probability of receiving water services than in 1994. 
These findings may suggest that in Guayaquil, water coverage among the poor has decreased 
during the past 10 years, both within the city and also relative to Quito. 
To explore whether there have been changes in the quality of water services in these 
cities, we use a detailed household employment survey that asks heads of households for their 
opinion about changes in water services (quality, pressure, and continuity) during the past six 
years. The survey was representative in both cities and included detailed information about 
household demographics, income, and employment. We analyze this data using both an ordered 
probit and a linear model. Our results suggest that, on average, perceptions of how water quality 
and water continuity have changed during the past six years in Guayaquil do not statistically 
differ from the same perceptions in Quito. Interestingly, the poorest quintile households in both 
cities consistently think that water quality has increased. This is not the case, however, with 
regard to water pressure. In all specifications, households systematically perceive that water 
pressure in Guayaquil has worsened relative to Quito.   7
Finally, we analyze the evolution of water prices in Quito and Guayaquil during a 10-
year period from January 1996 to July 2005 and find that the average price of water in Guayaquil 
has been higher after concession and has increased at a faster rate than in Quito, both in nominal 
and real terms.  
The previous quantitative results are useful to evaluate the individual performance of 
each water company over time. However, as discussed above, they cannot identify the casual 
effects of privatization. In both cities, there may have been several other factors not necessarily 
related to the concession that affected water performance. We document some of these factors in 
the rest of the paper. 
 First, we examine before-concession water-coverage trends and rural-to-urban migration 
patterns. We find that, from 1990 to 2000, Quito’s coverage levels were increasing at a very high 
rate, while the opposite occurred in Guayaquil, particularly in its rural marginal areas. 
Furthermore, migration rates to Quito during the past six years have been higher than migration 
rates to Guayaquil for all consumption-level quintiles, with differences being higher for poorer 
families. Secondly, we provide evidence about the institutional differences between these 
companies. Through interviews and focus groups, we implemented an institutional analysis of 
costs, quality, and performance that helps explain why Quito and Guayaquil have had such 
different experiences in water performance. Thus, if we want to identify the effect of the 
privatization of water services on coverage levels in Guayaquil, Quito may not be a suitable 
control group. We conclude that while it is tempting to compare water indicators between Quito 
and Guayaquil, it is clear that, through this exercise, the causal effects of water privatization on 
performance cannot be identified.  
The rest of the document is organized as follows. The second section provides 
background on the history of water companies in Guayaquil and Quito, emphasizing details 
about the concession of water services in Guayaquil. The third section presents changes in water 
services in these cities during the past 10 years. The fourth section explains why we cannot 
identify the effects of the privatization of water services. The last section concludes.   8




As the largest city in Ecuador, with a population of 2.5 million, Guayaquil has long struggled to 
provide adequate water and sewage services to its residents. In the early 1990s, its systems were 
in a state of near collapse. Financial mismanagement, inadequate maintenance and investment, 
and a history of overstaffing and political appointees all burdened its public utilities companies, 
which were heavily indebted and unable to provide basic services to the wave of unplanned 
communities that emerged with the construction of the perimetral (a highway that circles the city 
to alleviate vehicle congestion). Only 64 percent of the population had access to water service 
and only 46 percent had access to sewage in 2003 (Constance, 2003). With such low coverage 
rates, marginal communities were almost universally excluded from the official network and 
were left with no choice but to purchase water from tanqueros (private water-delivery trucks), 
which resulted in their paying 125 times more for water (sometimes up to 25 percent of their 
income) than those connected to the system (Ochoa and Prieto, 1995). 
2.1.1 The First Steps toward Privatization 
Recognizing a need for change, the municipal government initiated a restructuring process in 
1994 that fundamentally changed the face of public utilities in Guayaquil. It merged the two 
previously separate public water and sewage companies under the auspices of the Empresa 
Cantonal de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado de Guayaquil (ECAPAG) and began to lay the 
groundwork for the privatization of the sector.  
Upon the completion of the merger in 1996, ECAPAG set out to significantly reshape the 
provision of water and sewage services. By the late 1990s, it had streamlined staffing, created a 
division to respond to customer questions and complaints, and had improved efficiency in the 
operation of its services. The new ECAPAG began to expand distribution networks to 
marginalized areas of the city, rehabilitate treatment plants, purchase new, top-of-the-line 
equipment, and complete a process of extensive administrative and operational modernization.
4   
Although these public-system reforms were substantial, the level of indebtedness and the 
history of poor follow-through on loan obligations of the previous public utilities companies led 
international lenders to refuse access to credit for much-needed infrastructure construction 
                                                           
4 ECAPAG, undated document.   9
without significant involvement of the private sector.
5 While it was understood from the outset 
that ECAPAG would work toward implementing the long-term goal of privatization, it was not 
until 1995 that the ECAPAG directory officially approved the implementation process. In 
October 1997, Ecuador signed a loan contract with the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 
to finance the improvement of water and sewage services in Guayaquil—a contract that was 
contingent upon opening the sector to private concession. The loan granted by the IDB covered 
three principal areas: 1) the concession process, 2) the transformation of ECAPAG into a 
regulatory body, and 3) the rehabilitation of the potable water and sewage systems.
6 
2.1.2 The Concession with Interagua 
In 2001, ECAPAG signed a 30-year integrated concession with Interagua, a subsidiary of the 
International Water Group. This concession handed over commercial risk and responsibility for 
the operation, maintenance, and administration of all potable water and sewage services in 
Guayaquil, while maintaining ECAPAG as a regulator to ensure contract compliance. Key 
elements of the contract signed with Interagua include:
7 
 
•  Operation and maintenance of potable water and sewage systems. 
•  Investment to improve quality of service. 
•  5- and 10-year goals to improve minimum pressure, provision, and water 
quality. 
•  Investment to expand the system in the first five years. 
•  Obligation to install 55,238 new potable water connections and 55,238 
new sewage connections in the marginalized sectors of the city. 
•  Obligation to invest $520 million in infrastructure, in addition to 
investment in rehabilitation and new connections, by the end of the 30-
year contract. 
•  Obligation to install the number of new potable water and sewage 
connections necessary to reach 95 percent coverage of potable water and 
90 percent coverage of sewage by the end of the second fifth-year period. 
                                                           
5 Interview with ECAPAG General Manager Ing. Jose Luis Santos, conducted on August 16, 2005. 
6 ECAPAG., undated document. 
7 List of contract obligations taken from ECAPAG, undated document.   10
•  Beginning in the second fifth-year period, obligation to implement the 
new treatment plants and a macrosystem of drainage as dictated by the 
Master Plan. 
•  Obligation to respect and apply the pricing structure established by 
ECAPAG for the first five years. 
•  The full investment during the 30 years of contract should reach 
approximately $1 billion. 
 
The terms of the concession were specifically designed to avoid some of the pitfalls that 
arose under privatization schemes in other countries and, comparatively, can be considered 
relatively “poor friendly” in terms of coverage, price, and quality. Recognizing that one of 
Guayaquil’s greatest problems has been the lack of inclusion of poor communities in the 
coverage of water and sewage networks, the concession contract specifically requires new 
connections to be provided to these communities at no cost. Emphasis in the first five years of 
the contract is placed on Interagua providing a minimum number of these new connections, and 
marginal communities are identified and incorporated according to an official expansion plan. 
In order to avoid public backlash, as well as the burden of sudden price hikes, water 
tariffs are also strictly controlled for the initial years of the contract. The current tariff structure 
was designed and implemented by ECAPAG in the years prior to privatization to both more 
adequately cover the real costs of the system and to disassociate the changes in tariff structure 
from the privatization process so as to mitigate potential public backlash. For the first five years 
of the contract, the concessionaire is bound to uphold the pre-established pricing structure 
(barring any unforeseen changes on a national level that influence operational costs).   
The concession contract also controls for water quality through the use of pressure and 
quality samples taken throughout the city and submitted to a number of laboratories for testing. 
Samples are taken by both Interagua and ECAPAG and must fall within the guidelines stipulated 
in the contract or else sanctions and monetary fines can be imposed. 
2.1.3 Public Response to the Concession 
While there appeared to be very limited negative public opinion regarding the process in the 
initial years of the concession, the tide has recently turned, and the debate has become much 
more polarized. An increasing number of complaints have been emerging from marginal   11
communities regarding poorer water quality and charges for services they do not receive. Despite 
the pressure and quality standards stipulated in the contract, residents of Guasmo Sur
8 
consistently complain of turbid, foul-smelling water that is not fit for consumption, while 
residents of Suburbio Oeste
9 have struggled through both a hepatitis outbreak and periodic issues 
of decreased chlorine content/increased fecal content in the samples from their sector (Comisión 
de Control Cívico de la Corrupción 2005).  
In early 2005, the Observatorio Ciudadano de Servicios Públicos, a citizens’ watchdog 
group, was formed in an attempt to monitor the conduct and compliance of the concessionaire 
and regulator and to ensure a basic level of public and citizen accountability in the provision of 
the public good. Since its establishment, this group has issued numerous reports and forums 
analyzing and criticizing both Interagua’s compliance with the contract and ECAPAG’s capacity 
as a regulator (Observatorio Ciudadano de Servicios Públicos, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2005d, 
2005e, and 2005f) In an attempt to better measure public opinion on issues related to water 
provision and public participation, the Observatorio organized a survey in November 2005 that 
polled more than 40,000 citizens, primarily from marginal sectors. Although the poll was 
voluntary and administered only in certain sectors of the city, the results overwhelmingly 
demonstrated a desire for systemic change and increased citizen participation.
10 
Critiques of the services rendered by Interagua have also come from the governmental 
watchdog entities the Defensoría del Pueblo and the Comisión de Control Cívico de la 
Corrupción (CCCC), both of which investigated the issue of water quality in Suburbio Oeste. In 
addition, from May to October 2005 alone, more than 400 articles related to water appeared in 
the Guayaquil press. In many cases, these articles made an implicit comparison between water 
services in Guayaquil and Quito to argue against or in favor of the concession of water services. 
Moreover, in most cases, such comparisons were merely subjective.  
As stated in the introduction, we worry that this type of comparisons is not appropriate to 
identify the causal effects of privatization, since there may have been several other factors not 
                                                           
8 Guasmo Sur is a low-income sector located in the southern part of the city. 
9 Suburbio Oeste is a low-income sector located in the western part of the city. 
10 According to this survey, more than 90 percent of respondents thought that Interagua and ECAPAG are not 
fulfilling their responsibilities to ensure quality water and sewerage services that are accessible to all citizens of 
Guayaquil. Furthermore, 95 percent believed that the concession contract should be revised to contain clauses that 
guarantee the rights of all citizens of Guayaquil. Notice that, because of sample selection, these results are not 
representative of the whole population.   12
necessarily related to the concession that affected water performance. We illustrate this point in 
the last section.  
2.2 Quito 
Water-service providers in Quito have always been under the direct authority of the public 
sector. EMAAP-Q, the municipal company that runs water and sewage services in Quito, was 
created in the mid-1990s by combining the former public water and sewage companies. 
EMAAP-Q encountered financial-management difficulties in the 1980s and early 1990s and was 
not able to meet citizen needs. However, reforms to create more business-oriented practices—
such as cost savings and a stronger work ethic—increased efficiency and in turn, coverage. A 
detailed institutional analysis of Quito’s water company is presented in the fourth section of this 
document. 
3. Measuring Changes in Water Services between Quito and Guayaquil 
An objective comparison of water services in Quito and Guayaquil requires the construction of a 
set of indicators that allow such an evaluation. In this section, we construct and analyze the 
evolution of several indicators for water coverage, price, and quality in both cities during the past 
10 years (1995-2005). 
3.1 Coverage  
To explore household water coverage, we used data from two national income and expenditure 
surveys. Each survey consists of one representative (cross-section) sample of the urban 
population (about 12 cities) in Ecuador and was conducted by the Ecuadorian Institute of 
Statistics (INEC).
11 The first survey took place from August 1994 to August 1995, and the 
second in 2004. The surveys provide detailed information about household sources of income 
and expenditures for each respondent.
12 Descriptive statistics of this database are presented in 
Table 1. 
Our compiled database is a representative sample of the population of Quito and 
Guayaquil. The 1994 sample consists of 1,737 respondents (households) in Quito and 1,713 in 
                                                           
11 In Spanish, INEC stands for “Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos.” 
12 The INEC analyzed the structure of the households’ expenditures to establish a representative basket of goods and 
services and to compute the Ecuadorian Consumer Price Index in both 1995 and 2004.   13
Guayaquil, while the sample size of the 2004 survey is more than 40 percent higher in both 
cities.  
Because we were concerned with identifying changes in water-coverage levels among 
those located in the left tail of the income distribution, we collected several variables that provide 
information on household income level. For this, we measured households’ real income in terms 
of the number of representative baskets of goods and services (BGS) that they could buy with 
their total earned income.
13 According to the data shown in Table 1, mean household income (in 
real terms) decreased by about 4 percent in Quito and 20 percent in Guayaquil in the last decade. 
We also collected other information that describes the household’s socioeconomic status, 
such as the share of expenses allocated to food, the number of people living in the same 
household, the number of children below the age of five, and the education level of the head of 
the household. Household size and number of children under the age of five are important 
variables because they are generally negatively correlated to income. 
We use a binary probit model and our survey data to identify the conditional probability 
that a household has access to water services in Quito and Guayaquil. The dependent variable 
equals one if the household is connected to the water network. The control variables include the 
household’s income, the number of members in the family, and the head of the household’s 
education. We also include an explanatory dummy variable that equals one if the survey was 
taken in 2004 (that is, the “privatization” dummy variable).
14  
To analyze the changes in water-service coverage before and after concession, the binary 
models are estimated with our sample data in Guayaquil and Quito in separate regressions. In 
addition, because we seek to identify changes in the coverage level among the poor, we divide 
our population by per-capita income quintiles, and estimate the probit equation for each of these 
quintiles. Results are presented in Tables 3 and 4. We show both the value of the coefficients as 
well as the marginal effects (evaluated at the sample mean of the independent variables in each 
income quintile).  
 
                                                           
13 The monetary value of the set of goods and services that a representative household spends money on to satisfy its 
basic needs is computed by the INEC on a monthly basis. The monetary cost of this set of goods and services was 
$362 in 1994 and $387 in 2004. We use the INEC’s estimates to compute the real income of a household in our 
sample.  
14 Although the actual concession occurred in 2001, we refer to the 1994 survey as the “before concession” data, 
because it was the year before ECAPAG started undertaking drastic public-sector reforms in preparation for the 
hand-over to a private company.   14
The results for Guayaquil are shown in Table 2. In all income groups, the education level 
of the head of the household has statistically significant effects on the probability of having 
access to water services. This variable is most likely capturing the unobserved location of the 
housing unit, since higher-educated households tend to be located in neighborhoods that have 
better public services. Our results also provide evidence that, with the exception of the richest 
quintile of the population, families with children under five years of age have had less chance of 
having access to water in Guayaquil after concession. This result is worrying considering that the 
health of young children is jeopardized by the lack of formal service. 
The coefficients on the variable “privatization fixed effect” suggest that, on average, 
there are no significant changes in the probability of having access to water services before and 
after concession in Guayaquil. There is evidence, however, that households in the lowest income 
quintile have a lesser chance of receiving water services after concession. For example, the 
likelihood of these families obtaining water services decreased by approximately 7 percent in the 
past decade (Figure 1).   
  Coverage trends in Quito are quite different. In Table 3, we show evidence that, in 2004, 
the probability of having access to water services in Quito has increased during the past decade. 
While these effects are particularly large and statistically significant for the third and fourth 
income quintile, even first-income quintile households have notably increased the probability of 
being connected to the water network. For example, our results suggest that the likelihood of 
such low income families obtaining water services increased by about 3.5 percent. 
It is tempting to compare changes in water coverage indicators (before and after 
privatization) between these two cities and associate them with the effects of privatization.
15 
However, such comparisons could only identify the effects of privatization if Quito and 
Guayaquil were identical cities and if the privatization of water services was a random event. 
This is not the case. In both cities, there may have been several other factors not necessarily 
related to the concession that affected water coverage, such as previous water-coverage trends 
and rural-to-urban migration rates. We document these factors below.  
                                                           
15 For example, one could we use a “difference-in-difference” approach to explore the association between 
privatization and water coverage in these cities by estimating one binary model using data on both cities and adding 
“time,” “city,” and “private-owner” dummy variables to the set of other explanatory variables. A simpler and less 
rigorous comparison could consist of subtracting the marginal effects of the “privatization” dummy variable in 
Tables 3 and 4. For example, one may infer that, after privatization, a household in the first quintile in Guayaquil 
had a (0.035- (-0.066)) = 0.10 lower probability of receiving water services than a similar household in Quito.   15
3.2 Quality 
To measure whether the quality of water in Guayaquil has improved or worsened since the 
concession, the chemical and biological makeup of water samples taken before and after 2001 
should be analyzed. Unfortunately, such data are not available (at least not to the researchers).  
Information on water-quality samples in Guayaquil has been publicly available since 
October 2005, and we collected this data until January 2006 to determine whether poor 
neighborhoods have lower water quality. The data include details on the chemical composition of 
the water samples and the address of the properties where the samples were taken. We used the 
individual addresses to match the water-samples database with poverty data from the Ecuadorian 
2000 Census. While this analysis does not assess whether there have been any changes in water 
quality during the past 10 years, it does help us understand whether there are systematic 
differences in the quality of the water provided to the poor.  
We found 291 water-quality test records on the ECAPAG web page. Ten of those files 
would not open, 37 had missing information, and 44 locations could not be matched with a 
specific address. We then constructed a map of Guayaquil that divided the city into census zones 
and quintiles of poverty level as determined by a national poverty index in the Census (NBI for 
its initials in Spanish). Finally, the water records were matched with the Census poverty levels. 
Not surprisingly, water quality was tested at the highest rate by far in the richest areas, and the 
number of sites tested fell steadily as the poverty level of the location increased.  
The water-sample tests contained information on many variables (such as chlorine, 
turbidity, fecal residuals, bacterial analysis, and ph-levels). We focus on chlorine and water-
clarity indicators, because these are the only two available for most of the tested sites. Higher 
chlorine levels indicate larger amounts of disinfectant in the water. Lower turbidity indicates 
greater water clarity. As shown in Figure 2, wealthier areas generally had higher levels of 
chlorine and greater water clarity than poorer sectors. For example, poorer areas have an average 
of 20 percent less chlorine than other samples. However, those differences are not statistically 
significant. 
In the remaining part of this section, we explore whether there have been changes in the 
quality of water services in Guayaquil relative to Quito after concession. For this, we used a   16
detailed household survey that contains information on individuals’ perceptions of changes in 
various aspects of water quality during the past six years.
16  
We focus on three measures of water services that are available in the Ecuadorian 
Monthly Employment Survey: overall water quality (purity, odor), water pressure, and water 
continuity. In the April 2006 survey, heads of households were asked: “In your housing unit, has 
the quality/pressure/continuity of water improved, remained constant, or decreased over the past 
six years?” We use the responses to these questions and a simple regression analysis to identify if 
there are any systematic differences in these variables in Guayaquil relative to Quito. 
We use two types of regression models. The first is a traditional linear model and the 
second is an ordered probit model. The dependent variable is an integer that represents five 
different categories: 1) notably decreased, 2) decreased, 3) remained the same, 4) improved, and 
5) notably improved. We also include several independent variables that may explain the way 
individuals express their opinions about water issues. For example, it is possible that less-
educated people are more optimistic about the future and perceive that water quality changes 
have been higher than in reality. For this reason, we include several independent variables such 
as the number of children (age five and younger) in the housing unit and head of household’s 
age, gender, education, marital status, and employment status. Because we are interested in 
identifying effects among the poor, we also control for income by adding a set of dummy 
variables that describe the per-capita income quintile to which the household belongs.  
For both the linear and the ordered probit models we estimate three different 
specifications. In the first and second specification, we control for income and city effects only; 
the third adds several other independent variables to control for household demographics. The 
results are presented in Tables 4, 5, and 6. 
Our results suggest that, on average, perceptions in Guayaquil about how water quality 
and water continuity has changed during the past six years do not statistically differ from the 
same perceptions in Quito. However, the poorest quintile households consistently think quality 
has increased. This is not the case, however, with perceptions of water pressure. In all 
specifications, there is evidence that households think that water pressure in Guayaquil has 
worsened relative to Quito. In particular, this effect seems to be stronger among those 
                                                           
16 This survey is known as the Ecuadorian Employment Survey and is carried out by the Facultad Latinoamericana 
de Ciencias Sociales (Flacso)–Ecuador on monthly basis in the three largest urban areas in the country. The survey 
is used by the Central Bank of Ecuador to compute employment statistics and consumer confidence indices.    17
households in the second income quintile. These results are consistent with the fact that 
Interagua has made an effort to increase the number of water connections. Without increasing the 
production of water, water pressure inevitably worsens. 
These results provide useful information about how households’ perceptions of water 
quality in Quito and Guayaquil have changed over time. We emphasize, however, that these do 
not identify any causal effect of the privatization of water services. 
3.3 Price 
To analyze the price of water in Guayaquil before and after the concession, we compare monthly 
average water prices in Guayaquil and Quito during a 10-year period (January 1996 to July 
2005). This highly reliable information comes from monthly surveys undertaken by INEC with 
the objective of calculating the Consumer Price Index.
17  
Through these surveys, we analyze the evolution of the average cost of 30 cubic meters 
of water in Quito and Guayaquil. Figure 3 presents the amounts in current US dollars. From the 
beginning of 1996 until October 1999, water was on average 66 percent more expensive in 
Guayaquil than in Quito. On the other hand, from November 1999 to May 2000, water was 25 
percent more expensive in Quito than in Guayaquil. However, a few months after the concession, 
this tendency reversed, and the price of water in Guayaquil again surpassed the price of water in 
Quito. Thus, there exists evidence that after the concession, the average price of water in 
Guayaquil has increased in comparison to Quito. The price gap jumped to $3 (per-unit) 
immediately after concession and climbed steadily to more than $4 by 2005.  
To calculate the evolution of the price of water in real terms, we divided the nominal 
price of water in Quito and Guayaquil by the Price Index in each city. Then, we standardized the 
index so that the price of water in Quito in January 1996 is equal to 100. The corrected evolution 
of prices is represented in Figure 4. As in the last graph, the difference between the relative price 
of water in Guayaquil and the price in Quito is positive at the beginning of 1996 and decreases 
until a few months before privatization. Approximately six months before the concession, the 
difference becomes positive again and remains higher than Quito for the following years.  
                                                           
17 Pricing information taken from the water companies may be biased, since they may have incentives to provide 
misleading information. On the other hand, information collected by the INEC should be reliable.    18
It should be acknowledged that changes in nominal water prices in Guayaquil have been 
limited so far by the concession contract. Once the first five years of the concession are over, 
Interagua will be able to change tariffs without ECAPAG approval.  
4. Identifying the Effects of the Privatization of Water Services  
If Quito and Guayaquil were identical cities and the privatization of water services were 
randomly assigned to the latter city, some of the estimates in the previous section would measure 
the effects of privatization on water coverage, quality, and prices. This is, of course, not the case. 
Quito and Guayaquil are quite different cities, especially in terms of water provision.  
In this section, we first describe how differences in previous coverage trends and 
migration patterns between Quito and Guayaquil can bias our quantitative results. Then, we 
provide a detailed comparative institutional analysis of both water companies, which leads us to 
conclude that they face radically different environments and that Quito is not a suitable control 
group for identifying the effects of water concession in Guayaquil.   
4.1 Previous Trends in Water Coverage 
Figure 5 presents data on water-coverage levels in Quito and Guayaquil from three National 
Population and Housing Censuses. Unfortunately, the Census data do not allow us to analyze 
water-coverage levels by income quintile. We can only determine whether residences are located 
in rural or urban areas within the borders of these cities. However, because rural areas in both 
cities are primarily populated by poor families, it is reasonable to assume that coverage levels in 
rural areas are somewhat similar to the coverage levels of families that belong to the first income 
quintile.  
Using a simple linear extrapolation of the Census data, we estimate that by 2004 (the year 
of the income and expenditure survey), water-coverage rates in the rural areas of Guayaquil 
would have been 6.1 percent lower than corresponding coverage levels in 1994.
18 In the previous 
section, we provided evidence that, after concession, poor households (first income quintile) in 
Guayaquil decreased their likelihood of obtaining water services by approximately 7 percent. 
                                                           
18 According to the Census, water-coverage levels in rural Guayaquil were 18 percent in 1990 and 9.8 percent in 
2001, that is, they decreased at an average annual rate of 5.68 percent. Using this average annual decrease rate, we 
estimate that the corresponding water-coverage rates in 1994 and 2004 may have been 14.2 percent and 8.3 percent, 
respectively. The difference between the two is 6.1 percent.   19
Thus, previous trends in water-coverage levels may be explaining a large portion of the 
decreased access to water among the poor. 
Coverage levels in Quito’s rural areas, on the other hand, show an opposite trend. Quito 
made significant improvements, particularly, during the 1990s. In 1990, water coverage levels 
reached 32 percent; by 2001, they increased to 56 percent, and by 2004 they may have climbed 
to 65 percent.
19  
Before the concession of water services, Quito and Guayaquil showed completely 
different trends in their water-coverage levels, especially in the cities’ rural areas. Thus, Quito 
may not be a suitable control group to identify the effects of privatization of water services, 
particularly among those at the low end of the income distribution. 
4.2 Migration Trends and Urban Planning 
To understand changes in coverage levels between Quito and Guayaquil, it is also important to 
analyze the two cities’ migration trends. For example, higher rates of migration to Guayaquil 
may explain why water coverage decreased relative to Quito.  
Data from the 2004 Demographic Survey on Mother and Infant Health Survey 
(ENDEMAIN)
20 were used to identify migration rates. In this survey, heads of households in 
Quito and Guayaquil were asked if they had resided in the same city in 1999.
21 Furthermore, the 
survey contains information on households’ consumption is available and, therefore, we were 
able to rank households by their per capita consumption level. This information is displayed in 
Table 7. 
Clearly, migration rates to Quito are higher than migration rates to Guayaquil for all 
consumption-level quintiles, and these differences are higher for poorer families. Whereas only 8 
                                                           
19 Using a similar linear extrapolation, we may infer that water coverage levels in rural Quito increased from 39 
percent in 1994 to 65 percent in 2004.   
20 Since 1987, the Center for Population Studies and Social Development in Ecuador (CEPAR, for its initials in 
Spanish) has periodically published its “Demographic Survey on Mother and Infant Health,” the ENDEMAIN. The 
last survey was taken in 2004. Through the compilation of numerous statistics related to health care, infant and child 
mortality, reproductive health, fertility, domestic violence, sexually transmitted diseases, household demography, 
migration, and other topics, CEPAR attempts not only to describe, but also to identify any patterns or problems in 
terms of access to and usage of health services.  Socioeconomic status (based on consumption), for example, is one 
of the household statistics collected to ascertain if persons of lower socioeconomic status have less access to health 
care or have to spend more to obtain it than persons of greater socioeconomic status. The information is collected 
through household and individual surveys, with responses solicited from 17 different sections of the country. Of the 
10,966 observations in the 2004 ENDEMAIN, 1,151 come from Quito and 957 come from Guayaquil. For more 
details on the ENDEMAIN, see Angeles, Trujillo and Lastra (2005). 
21 Optimally, we would have liked to observe migration trends during the past 10 years to make our previous results 
comparable with our migration trends. However, we were not able to find such information.   20
percent of the poorest families in Guayaquil lived in another city five years earlier, 22 percent of 
the poorest families in Quito had recently migrated.  
The table provides evidence that the decrease in coverage in Guayaquil after concession 
relative to Quito could not be explained by migration trends to these cities. This provides 
additional evidence that Quito is not a suitable control group for identifying the effects of 
privatization of water services in Guayaquil. 
4.3 Other Institutional Factors  
In this section, we analyze the institutional environments of both companies. To understand the 
institutional contexts of these entities, we interviewed employees of EMAAP-Q, ECAPAG, 
Interagua, the University of San Francisco at Quito, the Inter-American Development Bank, and 
the Observatorio Ciudadano de Servicios Públicos. In addition, we conducted focus groups with 
residents of various marginal communities throughout Guayaquil to obtain first-hand accounts of 
their experiences with water services.
22  
Throughout this section, we provide evidence that these two companies are radically 
different in many ways and provide additional reasons why comparing changes in Quito’s and 
Guayaquil’s water services in the last decade may not be a useful exercise for identifying the 
effects of water service privatization. 
 
4.3.1 External Factors that Contribute to Performance 
 
Geographic characteristics. Both cities have geographic advantages and disadvantages in terms 
of capturing, cleaning, and distributing water. Quito, for example, has a more complicated 
system of carrying water from its sources to the city and its suburbs. Hundreds of kilometers of 
piping are used to transport water from seven water-capture sites to 22 treatment plants. 
Guayaquil, on the other hand, has only one source, the River Daule, and three treatment plants, 
which are relatively close in proximity. One could argue that Quito’s many capture and treatment 
sites complicate coordination and raise the cost of water production.  
However, the mountains surrounding Quito provide it with an advantage in terms of 
water pressure. The majority of the 172 water tanks are located above the valley that the city of 
Quito occupies, and therefore, EMAAP-Q has to restrain water pressure, not create it. On the 
other hand, the relatively flat topography of Guayaquil, combined with the fact that its treatment 
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plants are located above the river, means that money has to be invested not only in pumping 
water to the plant, but also in distributing it throughout the system. 
Probably the most important geographic characteristic that contributes to water entity 
performance is the quality of the water before it arrives at the treatment plants. Quito is proud 
that its water tests well below the water-turbidity requirement of 5 units, reaching the treatment 
plants at around 1 or 2 units. The water consumed by Quiteños comes from melted snow and 
glaciers from the various volcanoes surrounding the municipality, which is a great advantage not 
shared by Guayaquileños. To get the water to a point at which it is potable, Guayaquil’s 
treatment plants have to subject it to fairly extensive sedimentation and filtration processes in 
order to reduce the organic material and contamination caused by nearby factories, boats, and 
communities. Unfortunately, heavily treated water does not always guarantee lasting quality 
because the effects of the chlorine used in the treatment dissipate over time and as the water 
moves through the water mains.  
4.3.2 Water Companies and Political Influence 
According to several interviewees, Guayaquil’s political environment has been one of the 
primary causes of the poor historical performance of its public water providers. According to 
them, past (pre-privatization) water-service providers in Guayaquil did not operate as 
independent and technical entities, but as mechanisms by which to mobilize political power, 
damaging their institutional capacity and the provision of services.  
It was not until the establishment of ECAPAG in 1995 that the issues of overstaffing and 
political influence began to come under control. The national law establishing ECAPAG’s 
creation removed it from the influence of the local political scene and gave it the autonomy to 
carry out the provision of water and sewage services in an apolitical, technical manner. In 
preparation for the privatization process, ECAPAG began to streamline staffing as well as 
implement numerous administrative and organizational reforms. To this day, the municipality 
plays a very limited official role in water provision; the mayor simply has a representative who 
sits on the ECAPAG board.  
In contrast, interviewees in Quito emphasized the technical—not political—nature of, 
EMAAP-Q. Although low turnover rates are positive, Quito may also be suffering from 
overstaffing (see Table 8), indicating that it is not as efficient and apolitical as it would like to   22
appear. Although EMAAP-Q has not been heavily politicized, the mayor plays an active role in 
the company’s decisions. 
4.3.3 Measures of Efficiency and Current Performance 
We have chosen several indicators to measure the current institutional efficiency and 
performance of both water companies: 1) response to consumer complaints, 2) payment rate, 3) 
ratio of employees per 1,000 connections, 4) percentage of water lost, 5) general finances and 6) 
management and technical innovations. These indicators may provide a better sense of how 
efficiently and effectively the public and private institutions are working. 
Response to consumer complaints. Water-providing entities in both Quito and Guayaquil have 
mechanisms for receiving, processing, and addressing consumer complaints, but Quito’s appear 
to be more responsive and user-friendly. In Quito, there are two main systems by which to make 
a complaint—via telephone or via an EMAAP-Q office. There are 12 client services centers 
throughout the municipality, where 83 percent of the complaints are made. These offices are only 
open on business days from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m., but a call center additionally takes complaints 24 
hours a day. Both methods are connected to the AS400 system, which processes and distributes 
the complaints to the appropriate areas. According to the director of Client Services (Guaman, 
2005) there has never been a complaint related to the quality of water. Most have to do with 
billing problems, which are addressed by a home visit on the next working day. New connections 
are addressed within 20 days and reconnections within 48 hours after payment. Pipe breaks and 
technical complaints have response rates of 24 hours within the city of Quito and 48 hours in the 
parishes. In 2002, EMAAP-Q set a goal to keep the annual complaint rate below 1 percent of the 
number of consumers, a goal it surpassed in 2005 with a complaint rate of 0.35 percent. 
In Guayaquil, both Interagua and ECAPAG have established fairly thorough mechanisms 
for accepting and processing complaints, and the absolute number of complaints has actually 
gone down since the concession. Under ECAPAG, prior to privatization, the total number of 
complaints received per month averaged approximately two thousand, while Interagua now 
averages roughly 800. Complaints related specifically to billing have also decreased. In 2001-
2002 there were approximately 0.6 complaints related to billing per account, a number that has 
now decreased to 0.4.
23  
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Processes for receiving and attending to customer complaints have also expanded since 
the concession. Similar to EMAAP-Q, Interagua accepts complaints either through its call center, 
which is open from 7 a.m. to 8 p.m. Monday to Friday and with limited hours on Saturday, or 
through its two customer service centers in the northern and southern parts of the city, which are 
open from 8:30 a.m. to 4 p.m. Unfortunately, neither the Interagua nor ECAPAG call centers 
offer a toll-free number.
24  
Interagua responds to first-instance billing complaints within 30 days and second-
instance complaints within 10 days. Technical complaints have a much faster response time, 
which varies according to their gravity. Reconnections are made within 48 hours of payment.  
As the operator and provider of water services, Interagua has the primary responsibility 
for addressing consumer complaints and concerns. However, as the regulating entity, ECAPAG 
monitors the database of complaints received and responded to by Interagua and also acts as a 
third-instance appeal. When a consumer makes a complaint, the first two instances go through 
Interagua. However, if the consumer remains unsatisfied with the decision, he or she may file an 
appeal with ECAPAG, which then conducts its own investigation, reviews the prior decisions, 
and makes its own decision. Like Interagua, ECAPAG has initiated a call center to receive 
customer complaints and concerns and responds to such complaints within 30 days.  
While mechanisms for accepting and responding to complaints exist, focus groups 
conducted in marginal areas of the city reported high levels of frustration with Interagua’s 
responses to user complaints and requests.
25 Participants reported poor treatment by Interagua 
employees working in both the customer-service centers and in the field. Others felt that they 
were “given the run-around” when they attempted to get a response to the complaints they had 
filed.  
 
Payment rates. In Quito, the payment rate has increased substantially in the past 10 years, from 
42 percent in 1996 to 80 percent in 2004 (Table 8). Although the 20 percent still outstanding is 
high, it only represents what is owed by 3 percent of total customers.  
In Guayaquil, payment rates have also increased substantially—both since ECAPAG 
assumed control of water provision operations and in the four years of Interagua’s control. In the 
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assume the cost of the calls. 
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years prior to the creation of ECAPAG, payment rates averaged 50 percent, not enough to cover 
even the basic costs of water provision. Just before the concession, ECAPAG had reached a 
payment rate of approximately 76 percent. According to one of ECAPAG’s directors, since the 
concession, payment rates have continued to rise to 84 percent, with additional increases each 
year. In addition to accepting payments in Interagua offices, the company has worked to expand 
the methods through which monthly bills can be paid.
26  
 
Ratio of employees per 1,000 connections. An indicator commonly used to determine efficiency 
and management performance is the number of employees per 1,000 connections.
27 As shown in 
Table 8, Quito has approximately 6 employees per connection, down from 7.1 in 1996. 
Interagua, on the other hand, is right on the efficiency target with a ratio of 3 to 1,000. In this 
area, privatization has definitely had an impact on efficiency, considering that the pre-
privatization water providers in Guayaquil had extremely high employee per connection ratios.
28  
 
Physical and commercial losses. Another common measure of efficiency is the level of physical 
and commercial losses suffered by the water-provision companies, such as the amount of water 
unaccounted for either due to illegal connections, breaks in the system, or non-payment. In 2005, 
EMAAP-Q lost about 30 percent of its water (Table 8).  
Heavy losses in both of these areas have been one of the most serious problems in 
Guayaquil’s water provision system. Under the provincial water provision entity EPAP-G, which 
existed prior to ECAPAG, water losses reached 75 percent—one of the highest rates in Latin 
America (IDB, 1996). Since Interagua has assumed operations and begun to invest more heavily 
in system infrastructure and new connections, the level of loss, although still high, has begun to 
decline. It is now at approximately 67 percent. Losses also originate from clandestine 
connections to the official water network. At this point in time, there is no truly accurate estimate 
of the number of clandestine connections in Guayaquil. However, many have been created by 
low-income residents who have water mains near their house but who have never been provided 
with formal connections to the system. Interagua currently has a program to regularize such users 
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27 Based on technical criteria, experts typically recommend a ratio of approximately 2 to 3 employees per 1,000 
connections in this type of industry. 
28 In 1982, EMAP-G (one of the previous municipal water providers) had a ratio of 15 to 1,000 and at the end of 
1994, before control was turned over to ECAPAG, EPAP-G (the provincial water company that followed EMAP-G) 
had a ratio of 9.4 to 1,000 (Swyngedouw, 2004).   25
once their connections are discovered. As Interagua expands the number of new connections to 
the more marginal sectors of the city, the number of clandestine connections and concomitant 
losses is expected to decrease. 
 
General finances. As of 2005, EMAAP-Q has an annual budget of $200 million. The budget has 
grown by approximately $80 million in the past five years. Expenditures are divided as follows: 
60 percent project investment, 10 percent debt repayment, 20 percent operations and 
maintenance, and 10 percent administrative costs. EMAAP-Q earns its income from various 
sources: 60 percent service sales, 25 percent telecommunications taxes, 10 percent international 
loans, and 5 percent sales of electricity. The last item is perhaps the most interesting and 
innovative. Due to the fact that EMAAP-Q works with rushing water sources, it developed a 
system to generate electricity, earning almost 5 million dollars in 2004. Originally, the electricity 
created was used within EMAAP-Q. However, with increased production, it is now sold for 
additional income.  
In terms of loan history, EMAAP-Q has worked with several international creditors for 
more than 15 years. EMAAP-Q is proud to have a direct loan relationship with these creditors, 
which is not common in Ecuadorian public agencies, most of which must work through the 
Central Government.   
Unfortunately, information on Interagua’s general finances was not publicly available. 
According to ECAPAG, Interagua’s annual budget is $80 million, with approximately $40 
million going to general operating expenses and $25 million to investments. How Interagua 
allocates funds within these general categories and how it makes use of the $15 million 
unaccounted for remains unexplained.  
One possible explanation for performance differences between EMAAP-Q and Interagua 
may be related to their budgets. In the past 10 years EMAAP-Q has had a substantially higher 
budget than that of ECAPAG and Interagua. In particular, the telecommunications tax is said to 
give EMAAP-Q extra resources that allow it to afford higher employment levels.  
 
Management innovations. In addition to selling electricity, other important technological 
innovations have been undertaken. One was the implementation of a digital mapping system in 
Quito in 1998. Now that 100 percent of the commercial area of Quito has been mapped, 
technicians can more easily identify breaks or problems in the system. With these technological   26
improvements, technicians in charge of water production can measure the amount of water being 
produced at each capture site to divert it more effectively to processing plants. Another 
innovation has involved equipping treatment plants with a system to automatically and 
constantly test and treat the water.    
In regard to administrative innovations, EMAAP-Q had to develop an effective 
communications system to allow all 22 water plants to coordinate activities. Furthermore, 
EMAAP-Q uses its long-term strategic plan to calculate tariffs. Instead of basing the price of 
water on current costs, EMAAP-Q includes costs of future projects. Additionally, EMAAP-Q is 
aware of the advantages of using private companies to implement some activities, such as meter 
reading and the printing of bills. Finally, 97 percent of customers now have meters, allowing 
EMAAP-Q to charge consumers more fairly. The meters are changed every five years to avoid 
mistakes.  
While Interagua has implemented numerous reforms and innovations since assuming 
control of operations in 2001, the modernization of Guayaquil’s water services first began under 
the direction of ECAPAG in the late 1990s in preparation for opening the sector to private 
concession. In the years leading up to the concession, ECAPAG expanded the network, 
incorporating 43,000 new users from marginal areas in Guayaquil, conducting numerous projects 
to rehabilitate and optimize the functioning of the water and sewage system, and designing a plan 
for providing potable water to Isla Trinitaria, a marginal suburb of Guayaquil. ECAPAG also 
implemented various reforms to modernize its administrative and operational systems; among 
many other things, this included automating the billing system and undertaking significant 
improvements in customer service. 
As a subsidiary of a multinational company with access to the latest technological 
developments and innovations, Interagua has continued to build upon the modernization projects 
first begun under ECAPAG. However, because the relevant information is not available to the 
public, the number of innovations implemented by Interagua since 2001 has not been quantified 
in this paper. 
4.3.4 Other Factors Contributing to Institutional Strength 
Civil society participation. There are various indicators that can be used to measure civil society 
participation in water provision: 1) newspaper articles critiquing or exposing water company 
performance, 2) civil society movements or organizations that diffuse information to citizens and   27
press for reforms, 3) mechanisms provided by the water companies to receive feedback from 
citizens, and 4) programs promoted by the water companies to involve citizens in project 
activities.   
In Quito, general participation is low in the first three areas. In terms of citizen 
participation in program activities, the Department for Public Works for Social Development of 
EMAAP-Q provides the materials and technical support to make free connections to water and 
sewage systems if the community provides the manual labor.  
During 2005, the issue of citizen participation in the provision of Guayaquil’s water 
services began to gain attention. In part due to a number of scandals regarding water quality, as 
well as media attention generated by a newly formed watchdog group, the number of newspaper 
articles focusing on water company performance skyrocketed. From just May to October 2005, 
more than 400 water-related articles were printed in the local press.
29 In addition to this increased 
media attention, and perhaps a cause of some of it, a citizen watchdog group (the Observatorio 
Ciudadano de Servicios Publicos) was formed to publicly monitor Interagua and ECAPAG and 
hold them accountable for the services they provide.  
The Observatorio says it does not necessarily oppose the privatization of public services, 
but believes that adequate citizen oversight and accountability need to accompany such 
processes. Although the Observatorio is a relatively new organization and a fairly unique one in 
Ecuador, it hit the ground running, publishing numerous reports analyzing and critiquing the 
terms of the concession contract, the structure of ECAPAG, and the master plan for water and 
sewage development that was recently presented by Interagua.  
While the Observatorio’s efforts have definitely created a public dialogue around the 
quality of services being provided by Interagua and the responsibilities that ECAPAG holds as a 
regulator, official channels for citizen participation within both Interagua and ECAPAG remain 
severely limited.  
Regulatory bodies. In Ecuador, water provision has virtually no regulation at the national level.
30 
There exist, however several forms of self-regulation at the municipality level. For example, 
various members of EMAAP-Q mentioned that the entity is “self-regulated.” EMAAP-Q tests 
the quality of water in a laboratory that works independently from the Department of Water 
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Production. However, it is located on the same site, if not in the same building, and the 
laboratory receives almost 100 percent of its funding from EMAAP-Q. Nonetheless, according to 
the director, the independence of his laboratory is respected.  
Guayaquil, on the other hand, has a much more elaborate and established regulatory 
system, as is essential under privatization. Specific areas of regulation include the following: 
 
a)  Client Attention—ECAPAG monitors billing, consumer complaints, and 
Interagua’s response to said complaints. Monthly reports as well as 
Interagua’s databases are submitted to ECAPAG for review. Goals in this area 
focus on follow-through and response time in addressing complaints, not on 
the total number of complaints made. 
b)  Water Quality—ECAPAG conducts monthly/weekly regulation of water 
quality throughout the city by subcontracting a number of laboratories to do 
four counter samples in various sectors. In addition, ECAPAG is immediately 
informed of any complaint made to Interagua regarding water quality and 
sends its own team out to take counter samples. 
c)  Investments—ECAPAG specifically regulates Interagua’s completion of the 
required number of water/sewage connections stipulated in the concession 
contract. Because additional infrastructure investments are not required to go 
through any specific regulation or approval process, Interagua’s follow-
through in this area is indirectly regulated through its ability to meet service 
goals (such as pressure and continuity).   
d)  Finances—ECAPAG conducts regular reviews of Interagua’s financial 
statements to ensure that it is in good financial standing for the projects it 
seeks to undertake. The contract does not stipulate any further regulatory 
influence over company finances. 
5. Conclusions 
Through a comparative study of Ecuador’s two largest cities, Quito and Guayaquil, we have 
analyzed the coverage, quality, and pricing of their water-provision systems during the past 10 
years. This study provides two important contributions. First, we provide a battery of quantitative 
indicators of water performance in these two cities. We find evidence that, during this period,   29
water-coverage levels in Guayaquil have decreased, particularly among those in the first quintile 
of the income distribution. The opposite is true in Quito. Furthermore, our findings suggest that 
households systematically perceive that water pressure in Guayaquil has worsened relative to 
Quito. Finally, we find that both in nominal and real terms, the average price of water in 
Guayaquil is higher and has increased at a faster rate than in Quito. 
  These indicators provide useful information to evaluate the performance of the water 
companies over time. However, they cannot be used to assess the effects of privatization. The 
second contribution of our paper consists of documenting several differences between these two 
companies that should be considered when interpreting any of the quantitative findings. First, we 
show that before-concession water-coverage trends and rural-to-urban migration patterns are 
radically different in both cities. Thus, relative changes in coverage levels between Quito and 
Guayaquil cannot be attributed to privatization. In addition, we have conducted an exhaustive 
institutional analysis of the two entities to measure both the external as well as internal 
management factors and show that these two entities face significantly different environments. 
These institutional differences alone may explain a large portion of the results obtained in the 
statistical analysis.  
While it is tempting to compare water indicators between Quito and Guayaquil, it is clear 
that, through this exercise, the causal effects of water privatization on performance cannot be 
identified. To evaluate these causal effects further research is needed. 
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Table 1. 
Ecuador, Income-Expenditure Surveys by Year and City, Descriptive Statistics
31   
 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Water services 0.94 0.24 0 1.00 0.82 0.39 0 1.00
Income 1.94 2.77 0 38.88 1.94 2.67 0 31.75
Share of expenses in alimentation 0.24 0.19 0 0.99 0.29 0.20 0 1.00
# household members 4.21 1.78 1 15.00 4.84 2.03 1 16.00
# members below age 5 0.53 0.75 0 4.00 0.61 0.81 0 5.00
Years of education head household 10.12 4.96 0 22.00 9.01 4.89 0 22.00
Observations
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Water services 0.97 0.16 0 1.00 0.80 0.40 0 1.00
Income 1.87 1.31 0 10.94 1.55 1.08 0 7.30
Share of expenses in alimentation 0.32 0.18 0 0.84 0.45 0.22 0 0.91
# household members 3.78 1.71 1 14.00 4.36 2.21 1 26.00
# members below age 5 0.43 0.68 0 3.00 0.59 0.85 0 6.00











                                                           
31 Water services refers to the percentage of households that have access to a public water network; income is 
measured in terms of the number of representative baskets of goods and services (BGS) that a household could buy 
with its total earned income; share of expenses in alimentation is the percentage of total expenditure that a 
household spends toward alimentation; the number of household members and the number of children below age five 
are measured in units; and finally, the number of years of education of the head of the household includes all 
primary, secondary, and higher education.   31
 
Table 2. 
Guayaquil: Before and after Privatization: 
Probit Estimates of Access to Water Services 
(Dependent variable equals 1 if household is covered) 
 
Constant 0.047 -0.121 0.335 * -0.062 1.039 ***
(0.151) (0.170) (0.180) (0.207) (0.265)
Privatization fixed -0.188 ** -0.066 ** -0.071 -0.023 -0.079 -0.019 0.115 0.018 -0.335 -0.022 *
effect (0.083) (0.029) (0.090) (0.029) (0.106) (0.026) (0.136) (0.022) (0.212) (0.012)
Number of household 0.081 *** 0.029 *** 0.085 *** 0.027 *** 0.048 0.012 * 0.176 *** 0.027 *** 0.032 0.002
members (0.021) (0.007) (0.025) (0.008) (0.030) (0.007) (0.049) (0.007) (0.059) (0.004)
Number of household -0.18 *** -0.064 *** -0.151 *** -0.049 *** -0.229 *** -0.057 *** -0.233 ** -0.036 ** -0.089 -0.006
members < age 5 (0.045) (0.016) (0.055) (0.018) (0.074) (0.018) (0.113) (0.017) (0.177) (0.012)
Years of education 0.038 *** 0.013 *** 0.066 *** 0.021 *** 0.065 *** 0.016 *** 0.074 *** 0.012 *** 0.071 *** 0.005 ***
head of household (0.012) (0.004) (0.012) (0.004) (0.012) (0.003) (0.013) (0.002) (0.017) (0.001)
Number of observations
Standard errors in parenthesis
The covariance matrix was calculated using White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Method
 * significant at the 10% level
 ** significant at the 5% level
 *** significant at the 1% level
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Table 3.  
Quito: Before and after Privatization: 
Probit Estimates of Access to Water Services 
(Dependent variable equals 1 if household is covered) 
 
Constant 0.42564 * 1.01087 *** 0.75649 *** 1.38973 *** 1.30379 **
(0.229) (0.268) (0.251) (0.372) (0.555)
Privatization fixed 0.23372 0.03538 * 0.18475 0.01731 0.60336 *** 0.05366 *** 0.54841 ** 0.02162 ** 0.45211 0.0047
effect (0.146) (0.021) (0.156) (0.015) (0.160) (0.016) (0.227) (0.010) (0.354) (0.004)
Number of household 0.04547 0.00719 -0.0546 -0.005 0.03193 0.00241 0.00501 0.00015 -0.0015 -1E-05
members (0.036) (0.006) (0.042) (0.004) (0.049) (0.004) (0.059) (0.002) (0.124) (0.001)
Number of household -0.0998 -0.0158 -0.0211 -0.002 -0.2666 ** -0.0201 ** 0.11061 0.00339 0.03342 0.00026
members < age 5 (0.082) (0.013) (0.105) (0.010) (0.135) (0.010) (0.206) (0.006) (0.274) (0.002)
Years of education 0.10021 *** 0.01585 *** 0.10613 *** 0.00982 *** 0.07288 *** 0.0055 *** 0.04024 0.00123 * 0.08332 *** 0.00066 *
head of household (0.020) (0.003) (0.024) (0.002) (0.017) (0.001) (0.025) (0.001) (0.032) (0.000)
Number of observations
Standard errors in parenthesis
The covariance matrix was calculated using White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Method
 * significant at the 10% level
 ** significant at the 5% level
 *** significant at the 1% level
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Table 4. 
Changes in Water Quality during the Past Six Years 
(Dependent variable: Has the quality of water improved, remained constant,  
or decreased during the past six years?) 
 
Constant 2.838 *** 2.846 *** 2.959 ***
(0.039) (0.046) (0.145)
Guayaquil fixed effect 0.046 0.021 0.021 0.091 0.04 0.041
(0.035) (0.077) (0.079) (0.070) (0.151) (0.155)
Household belongs to 0.118 ** 0.072 0.068 0.233 ** 0.142 0.135
income quintile No 1 (0.059) (0.093) (0.098) (0.117) (0.185) (0.193)
Household belongs to 0.082 0.043 0.04 0.161 0.085 0.082
income quintile No 2 (0.057) (0.079) (0.086) (0.113) (0.154) (0.167)
Household belongs to -0.012 -0.056 -0.054 -0.03 -0.12 -0.116
income quintile No 3 (0.050) (0.069) (0.073) (0.099) (0.137) (0.143)
Household belongs to -0.045 -0.005 -0.005 -0.092 -0.013 -0.014
income quintile No 4 (0.052) (0.068) (0.070) (0.103) (0.135) (0.138)
Guayaquil and household 0.078 0.083 0.157 0.166
income quintile  No 1 (0.124) (0.124) (0.245) (0.246)
Guayaquil and household 0.082 0.096 0.161 0.189
income quintile  No 2 (0.116) (0.119) (0.229) (0.234)
Guayaquil and household 0.091 0.092 0.187 0.189
income quintile  No 3 (0.102) (0.103) (0.202) (0.203)
Guayaquil and household -0.09 -0.089 -0.178 -0.176
income quintile  No 4 (0.106) (0.107) (0.209) (0.210)
Household demographic No No Yes No No Yes
variables 
a
Number of observations 1131 1131 1131 1131 1131 1131
R2 0.01 0.02 0.02
Standard errors in parenthesis
The covariance matrix was calculated using White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Method
 a Demographic variables include: the number of children (age 5 and younger) in housing unit, 
      head of household's age, gender, education, marital status, and employmet status.
 * significant at the 10% level
 ** significant at the 5% level
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Table 5. 
Changes in Water Continuity during the Past Six Years 
(Dependent variable: Has the amount of time when water services are available increased,  
remained constant, or decreased during the past six years?) 
 
 
Constant 2.839 *** 2.852 *** 2.889 ***
(0.035) (0.039) (0.145)
Guayaquil fixed effect 0.054 0.015 0.026 0.101 0.039 0.06
(0.037) (0.075) (0.079) (0.071) (0.145) (0.152)
Household belongs to 0.081 -0.076 -0.089 0.155 -0.139 -0.168
income quintile No 1 (0.063) (0.097) (0.098) (0.121) (0.187) (0.190)
Household belongs to 0.114 ** 0.108 0.1 0.225 ** 0.221 0.206
income quintile No 2 (0.057) (0.075) (0.079) (0.110) (0.147) (0.154)
Household belongs to 0.066 0.015 0.012 0.13 0.037 0.032
income quintile No 3 (0.051) (0.064) (0.069) (0.100) (0.127) (0.135)
Household belongs to -0.025 0.017 0.011 -0.049 0.038 0.027
income quintile No 4 (0.049) (0.061) (0.062) (0.095) (0.118) (0.120)
Guayaquil and household 0.244 * 0.245 * 0.451 * 0.456 *
income quintile  No 1 (0.132) (0.133) (0.253) (0.255)
Guayaquil and household 0.025 0.025 0.034 0.036
income quintile  No 2 (0.117) (0.120) (0.225) (0.230)
Guayaquil and household 0.11 0.106 0.196 0.189
income quintile  No 3 (0.106) (0.109) (0.206) (0.211)
Guayaquil and household -0.094 -0.098 -0.195 -0.205
income quintile  No 4 (0.104) (0.106) (0.201) (0.205)
Household demographic No No Yes No No Yes
variables 
a
Number of observations 1131 1131 1131 1131 1131 1131
R2 0.01 0.02 0.02
Standard errors in parenthesis
The covariance matrix was calculated using White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Method
 a Demographic variables include: the number of children (age 5 and younger) in housing unit, 
      head of household's age, gender, education, marital status, and employmet status.
 * significant at the 10% level
 ** significant at the 5% level
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Table 6. 
Changes in Water Pressure during the Past Six Years 
(Dependent variable: Has the pressure of water improved, remained constant,  
or decreased during the past six years?) 
 
Constant 3.018 *** 3.044 *** 3.01 ***
(0.039) (0.045) (0.176)
Guayaquil fixed effect -0.1 ** -0.177 ** -0.166 * -0.171 ** -0.305 ** -0.287 **
(0.039) (0.082) (0.085) (0.067) (0.142) (0.145)
Household belongs to 0.022 -0.105 -0.105 0.038 -0.182 -0.182
income quintile No 1 (0.069) (0.095) (0.099) (0.117) (0.164) (0.170)
Household belongs to -0.039 -0.135 * -0.134 * -0.068 -0.233 * -0.233 *
income quintile No 2 (0.060) (0.077) (0.081) (0.102) (0.132) (0.139)
Household belongs to -0.074 -0.101 -0.1 -0.127 -0.175 -0.173
income quintile No 3 (0.056) (0.073) (0.076) (0.096) (0.125) (0.131)
Household belongs to -0.124 ** -0.099 -0.097 -0.214 ** -0.171 -0.168
income quintile No 4 (0.056) (0.070) (0.071) (0.096) (0.120) (0.121)
Guayaquil and household 0.221 0.21 0.382 0.363
income quintile  No 1 (0.138) (0.140) (0.237) (0.241)
Guayaquil and household 0.208 * 0.208 * 0.357 * 0.358 *
income quintile  No 2 (0.123) (0.125) (0.211) (0.214)
Guayaquil and household 0.08 0.069 0.138 0.12
income quintile  No 3 (0.116) (0.117) (0.199) (0.201)
Guayaquil and household -0.044 -0.056 -0.075 -0.096
income quintile  No 4 (0.117) (0.117) (0.200) (0.200)
Household demographic No No Yes No No Yes
variables 
a
Number of observations 1131 1131 1131 1131 1131 1131
R2 0.01 0.02 0.02
Standard errors in parenthesis
The covariance matrix was calculated using White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Method
 a Demographic variables include: the number of children (age 5 and younger) in housing unit, 
      head of household's age, gender, education, marital status, and employmet status.
 * significant at the 10% level
 ** significant at the 5% level
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Table 7.  
Migration Patterns in Quito and Guayaquil 




12345 O v e r a l l
Number of Respondents 290 389 416 580 580 2,255
% Lived in same city 78% 86% 86% 90% 95% 88%
% Lived somewhere else 22% 14% 14% 10% 5% 12%
Number of Respondents 203 433 541 500 375 2,052
% Lived in same city 92% 92% 98% 97% 93% 95%
% Lived somewhere else 8% 8% 2% 3% 7% 5%
Difference in migration rates between 0.145 0.058 0.121 0.074 -0.013 0.070
Quito and Guayaquil (0.031) (0.022) (0.018) (0.014) (0.016) (0.008)
Source: ENDEMAIN 2004








Management Indicators from Guayaquil’s and Quito’s Water Companies 
 
Guayaquil  Quito  Indicator 
Before 
concession 
Actual 1996  Actual 
Number of employees / 1,000 connections  9.4  3  7.1  6.1 
Percent of water lost due to leaks in the 
system or non-payment 
79%   68%  Not 
Available 
30% 
Payment rate  50% (1996) 
76% (2001) 
84% 62%  79% 
Percent connections with meters  24%  49%  67%  97% 
 
Source: EMAAP-Q and Interagua.   38
Figure 1. 
Likelihood of Having Access to Water Services in Guayaquil in 2004 Relative to 1994 
(Before and after privatization) 
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Figure 2. 
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Turbidity Chlorine Number of tested sites
 
 
Source: Chemical composition of water was drawn from ECAPAG water samples. Poverty data come from the 2000 
Census. Poverty was measured using a poverty index based on the infrastructure of the household dwellings. The 
index is called NBI (“Necesidades Básicas Insatisfechas”).   40
Figure 3. 






Index of the Price of Water Services in Quito and Guayaquil in Real Terms 
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Source: Population and Housing Census. Rural and Urban definitions are according to the Ecuadorian Census. 
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Appendix 1: Interviews and Focus Groups 
Interviews: 
Andrade, E. Gerente Financiero, EMAAP-Q. Interview conducted on November 8, 2005. 
Cardenas, C. Director, Observatorio Ciudadano de Servicios Públicos. Interview conducted on 
December 14, 2005. 
Carpio, M. Director de Planificación and Gerente de Desarrollo Institucional, EMAAP-Q. 
Interview conducted on October 26, 2005. 
Cevallos, J. Jefe de Producción, EMAAP-Q. Interview conducted on November 9, 2005. 
Espinoza, C. Director de Control y Regulación Economica, ECAPAG. Interviews conducted on 
November 17, 2005, and on March 17, 2006. 
Guamán, F. Jefe de Departamento de Servicio al Cliente, EMAAP-Q. Interview conducted on 
November 11, 2005. 
Ojeda, F. and V. Parreno. Jefe del Departamento de Producción y Director del Laboratorio 
Central de Calidad, EMAAP-Q. Interview conducted on November 25, 2005.   
Quelal, E. Jefe del Departamento de Cartera y Cobranzas, EMAAP-Q. Interview conducted on 
November 10, 2005. 
Rodriguez, M. Jefe Administrativo y Financiero, ECAPAG. Interview conducted on November 
18, 2005. 
Rodríguez, O. Jefe del Departamento de Obras de Desarrollo Solidario, EMAAP-Q. Interview 
conducted on November 10, 2005. 
Santos, J.L. Gerente General, ECAPAG. Interview conducted on August 16, 2005. 
Suardi, M. and F. Chang. Interagua. Interview conducted on November 18, 2005. 
Vera, H. Analista Superior de Inversiones y Obras, ECAPAG. Interview Conducted on 
December 28, 2005. 
 
Focus Groups Conducted in Guayaquil: 
•  Mapasingue                                                                          November 26, 2005 
•  Cooperativa 5 de Diciembre/Pascuales                               November 26, 2005 
•  Guasmo Sur—Cooperativa Marioxi Febres Cordero         December 3, 2005 
•  Batallón de Suburbio                                                           December 4, 2005 
 